Practical DMA Attack Protection for FreeBSD

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Motivations

DMA attack vulnerability

Exposed system buses

IOMMU driver overhead



Improve driver performance

Don't sacrifice security properties

IOMMU



VT-d Driver in FreeBSD

	IOVA	Page Table	Page Table	IOTLB
	Allocation	Synch.	Memory	Invalidation
FreeBSD	Red-Black Tree	Coarse Lock	Reclaimed	Strict [*]

* loader tunable

Experimental Setup

iperf3 benchmark on 40G NICs

The machine under test has a 3.40 Ghz Intel Xeon E3-1231 Haswell CPU with 4 cores and hyperthreading disabled.

The supporting machine has a 3.50 Ghz Intel Xeon E3-1240 Skylake CPU with 4 cores and two hardware threads per core. It always operates with the IOMMU disabled.

Both machines have 32GB of DDR3 RAM and are connected back-to-back by Intel XL710 QDA1 40G NICs. They run FreeBSD HEAD with debugging kernel options disabled.

Baseline Performance



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A New Design

Idea: have the IOVA allocator handle page table management

Vmem hierarchy:

- constant-time IOVA allocation
- implicit page table synchronization
- per-CPU caching

VT-d Driver Comparison

	IOVA Allocation	Page Table Synch.	Page Table Memory	IOTLB Invalidation
BSD-vmh	Vmem Hierarchy (CPU Caches)	Implicit, Lock Free	Reclaimed	Strict [*]
FreeBSD	Red-Black Tree	Coarse Lock	Reclaimed	Strict [*]

* loader tunable

Results



Batching in BUS_DMA(9)

bus_dmamap_load_mbuf_sg() made a call to the IOMMU driver for each mbuf in a chain

Solution: preprocess **mbuf** chains and make a single call

Results



Future Work

Optimize additional IO paths

Develop a generic IOMMU library

Add security properties